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We Don’t Need No Noumena? Freedom Through
Rational Self-Cultivation in Kant 
LOUISE R. CHAPMAN
In this paper I argue that we find in Kant a more plausible alternative to
his transcendental conception of freedom. In the Metaphysics of Morals
in particular, we find a naturalistic conception of freedom premised upon
a theory of rational self-cultivation. The motivation for a naturalising
reading of Kant is two-fold. On the one hand, a naturalistic conception of
freedom avoids the charges levelled against Kant’s 'panicky metaphysics',
which both forces us to accept an ontologically extravagant picture of the
world and the self, and also commits us to understanding freedom in non-
spatiotemporal terms, thus excluding the possibility that the process of
becoming free is progressive. And second, on a naturalistic reading we
can repackage normativity back into Kant’s account of freedom, which
has seemed to scholars unacceptably absent. I explain how the process of
becoming free, on the naturalistic view, involves cultivating certain
'aesthetic preconditions of the mind’s receptivity to concepts of duty'.1
Happily, these conditions incur no unpalatable ontological penalties;
rather, they constitute an achievement of the rational aspect of the self.
Pointedly, this is not a self who is free only in virtue of having member-
ship in the noumenal realm. Rather, effortful self-development entails a
battle to become practically free, and thereby moral. The primary attrac-
tion to this reading of Kant is that it describes freedom as a naturalistic
achievement, rather than a metaphysical given. Thus I show that by jettis-
oning, or at least naturalising, the picture of noumenal selfhood we not
only find a theory that is poorer in panicky metaphysics, but much richer
in normative force. 
1  Paul Guyer, 'Progress Towards Autonomy,' in Kant on Moral Autonomy ed. Oliver
Sensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 76.
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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to bring to light, and critically examine, a
novel and normatively richer alternative to Kant’s transcendentalist
account of freedom. By looking beyond Kant’s most famous ethical texts
and towards his final ethical treatise, the Metaphysics of Morals,2 in
particular part two of that work, The Doctrine of Virtue, we find Kant
discussing freedom in much earthier terms—worlds apart from his earlier
transcendentalist account. In particular, Kant propounds the view that as
human beings we have the power to cultivate inner-freedom through a
process of self-mastery, or autocracy.3 Crucially, this alternative account
of freedom excludes its transcendentalist predecessor, given that freedom
understood as self-cultivation in accordance with a rational principle is a
temporally-extended process, whereas freedom on the transcendentalist
schema can succumb to no such rubric. 
I will be following the lead of Paul Guyer in proposing a compati-
bilist reading of Kant that allows the possibility of freedom consistent
with the laws of nature, when we understand freedom as a condition culti-
vated through a naturalistic process of self-mastery.4 A concern that will
appear germane, not to mention threatening, to any compatibilist or natu-
ralistic account of freedom stems from Kant’s claims about causation in
the Second Analogy of the first Critique. Kant’s claims in the Second
2 Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals (1797) was written nearly a decade after the
Groundwork (1785) and second Critique (1788). 
3 It is worth explaining what separates autonomy from autocracy in Kant’s practical
corpus. Autonomy is the legislative power of the will, that is, the power the will has
to set laws for itself, meanwhile autocracy can be understood as an executive
power, without which inclination would drag us away from self-legislated maxims.
Autonomy can therefore be called merely legislative, while autocracy is the
strength (fortitudo moralis) of the will to bat away contra-moral inclinations—
autonomy is the capacity of the will to set the law, autocracy the capacity to abide
by its dictates. In Kant’s discussion of self-cultivation, then, autonomy has no part
to play, since autonomy is presupposed as a property of the will in virtue of our
part-rational/part-sensible constitution. Autocracy, by contrast, is an empirically
acquired disposition that we can progressively cultivate. It follows that an
autonomous being that has not cultivated autocracy might be called akratic in the
sense adopted by Aristotle, for that being has not attempted to cultivate the strength
of will required to follow through on rational self-legislation. See Baxley (2010),
pp. 50-60.  
4 Paul Guyer, 'Naturalistic and Transcendental Moments in Kant's Moral
Philosophy,' Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (2007), pp. 444-
464.
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Analogy commit him to determinism of natural causes, whereby every
phenomenal event must have a corresponding phenomenal cause. Thus,
human action, when considered as the effect of a psychological event,
must also fall within the purview of the Second Analogy. 
My task here, however, isn’t to attempt a way out of the mecha-
nism of nature. To the contrary, I am interested in how within the remit of
empirical psychology Kant believes we can enhance our susceptibility to
the demands of morality, which constitutes part of his task in the Meta-
physics of Morals. While his challenge in the Groundwork was to derive
the supreme principle of morality, in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
investigates how, as empirically situated and imperfectly rational beings,
we actually become psychologically susceptible to this principle. While,
therefore, in deriving the moral law in the Groundwork Kant makes a
vehement prohibition on the role of sensibility and anthropology to the
metaphysics of morals, Kant eventually concedes in The Doctrine of
Virtue that in becoming receptive to the concept of duty (a necessary
condition on becoming its executor), we must employ some mode of
sensibility, which Kant discusses under the title the 'aesthetic of morals'.5
There is, therefore, a positive role for feeling in Kant’s ethics, viz. in
becoming receptive to the demands of duty, where unlocking this recep-
tivity largely consists in overthrowing contra-moral inclinations. Kant
suggests that in the very removal of hindrances to acting from duty we
make a substantive moral gain. Though Kant does not put this spin on his
account, I consider this moral gain to be an increase in our freedom to act
from duty. 
Incentives in the will, Kant suggests in the second Critique, operate
according to a hydraulic model, whereby in gaining mastery over inclina-
tion we enhance our capacity to act from duty.6  How we gain mastery
over inclination in the first instance involves fostering a competing non-
pathological feeling that opposes and overthrows pathological incentives
in the will: practical or moral feeling. Kant characterises moral feeling in
The Doctrine of Virtue as our 'susceptibility on the part of free choice
[Willkür] to be moved by pure practical reason [Wille]'.7  Cultivating
5 Immanuel Kant, trans. Mary Gregor, The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:406.
6 '[H]umiliation on the sensible side […] is an elevation of the moral […] [for],
whatever diminishes the hindrances to an activity is a furthering of this activity
itself.' Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, [5:79].
7 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, [6:528-9].
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moral feeling as part of an arsenal of aesthetic preconditions of our
susceptibility to the demands of duty has the effect of drowning out the
beckoning calls of countervailing incentives and, as a result, brings the
voice of pure practical reason—identifiable with the will (Wille) itself—
into audible range. So in the process of silencing countervailing incen-
tives, we gradually realise our capacity to listen to the voice of the will,
whose ends and edicts just are those of the categorical imperative. At the
empirical level, we can use the power of choice (Willkür) to enhance our
pro-moral sentiments such that contra-moral calls to action become
progressively silenced (though never fully extirpated), and the voice of
practical reason becomes audible. Over time, and with consistent practice,
practical reason can become the loudest voice in our entire volitional
system. 
According to this story, it is not the case that acting from duty is
directly produced by a mechanism of nature. After all, self-cultivating in
the way I have described is a not a determinate cause to acting from duty.
It is, however, a process that imperfectly rational agents like ourselves
must of necessity undertake in order to become receptive to the concept
of duty in the first instance. The conclusions of the Second Analogy
shouldn’t, therefore, threaten how we understand the freedom of moral
actions according to the narrative of this paper. Though we need to culti-
vate ourselves in order to become receptive to the dictates of practical
reason (our objectively moral ends), even then we retain the capacity to
do otherwise, that is, fail to carry out our duty. Insofar as we are capable
of practising and reinforcing autocracy through the dominion of moral
over pathological feeling, we progressively improve our capacity to
discern the voice of pure practical reason. And it is insofar as our discern-
ment improves (which I like to understand along the lines of increased
audibility), that our executive capacity correlatively improves—but
merely improving our discernment of the moral law neither guarantees
nor causes its execution. Notwithstanding, without at least cultivating our
capacity to listen to the moral law, its execution would be practically
impossible. It is this story about cultivation that I wish to tell, and which,
to the extent that it can be construed as a theory of freedom, makes it
more interesting than its transcendental counterpart.8  The story of self-
8 Notwithstanding, concerns will rightly linger regarding under what taxonomy of
desire our so-called ‘pro-moral’ inclination falls, such that it can provide the right
kind of inclination to morality, and, moreover, such that it has the right causal
origin. Across his moral and anthropological work, Kant has reflected a spectrum
of opinions regarding the rightful place of inclination in ethics. It is not
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cultivation indexes the conditions of possibility of freedom to the empiri-
cal world, and so what grounds our freedom to act from duty must be
considered as dependent upon our empirical location and constitution,
since it requires both a spatiotemporally extended process, and man’s
faculty of sensibility.9 
The structure of this paper
In what follows, I will first (§1) outline the transcendental picture
of freedom—to reject it requires giving it a fair hearing. Then (§2a) I will
construct my positive thesis, namely the suggestion that our capacity for
freedom can be actively cultivated through rational self-mastery or autoc-
racy. I will explain how (§2b), in specific, the process of self-cultivation
enables us to become the kinds of agents who choose in accordance with
the moral law. I will then explain (§3) how this account of freedom
enriches Kant’s deontology, by suggesting that our foremost duty as
moral agents is to cultivate the conditions for freedom. In the last section
(§4) I expose the metaphysical differences between the theses in tension
in this paper. Finally, I reiterate the intended scope of this paper, to antici -
pate objections regarding the extent of my conclusion. 
§1. (Why) We Don’t Need No Noumena
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes commitment to tran-
scendental idealism a requirement of all practical philosophy. He claims
that if we deny transcendental idealism we lose all practical freedom and
so, for the purposes of ethical theory, questions such as what ought to
uncontroversial to suggest that by the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant’s once fanatical
prohibition on the role of sensibility in morality had softened. Kant’s considered
view about inclination is quite distant from his position in the Groundwork, though
his position in that work is often cited as though it reflects his considered view. 
9 Is the thesis about transcendental freedom really in competition with the story
about freedom acquired through self-cultivation? There are ways in which the self-
cultivation story supplants transcendental freedom, but there still remains an
explanatory gap about the possibility of free action. Though it is beyond the scope
of this paper, I am also inclined to attempt a naturalistic reading of Kant on this
point, invoking a Frankfurtian model of volition, employing Kant’s notions of
Wille and Willkür as the respective faculties involved in reflective endorsement. On
such an account we could once again do away with Kant’s heavy metaphysics, and
give a plausible account of free action within the parameters of empirical
psychology.
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have happened evaporate.10 Without transcendental idealism and the free-
dom it discloses, Kant thinks our actions inevitably succumb to the model
of the Second Analogy, which states that every event is determined by
another in time, in accordance with necessary laws.11 But transcendental
idealism, Kant claims in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics,
'negates the impudent assertions of […] fatalism […] and [serves] to
provide moral ideas with the space outside the field of speculation.'12 So
how is this possible on the transcendentalist account?
Put succinctly, transcendental freedom is a pure transcendental idea
that must be regarded from two points of view. On the one hand it can be
regarded as a thing-in-itself, a causality intelligible in its action, whilst
also belonging to the natural world, wherein it is sensible in its effects. So
when we bring the subject into the picture, we can say that the transcen-
dental self qua noumenon enjoys agent-causal libertarianism: the power
to be a causality given its fundamental membership in the world of intelli-
gence. At the level of phenomenon, however, the self is situated in a
world where 'every event is causally determined.'13 Thus, according to
Kant’s transcendental picture, it is in virtue of the self’s noumenal
membership that our actions can be called free. 
As Kant sees it, the two-part self can begin a causal process in the
noumenal realm, the effects of which are reflected in the phenomenal
realm, in the form of free actions. So when we as agents take these two
points of view, we are entitled to think of ourselves as free, given our
primitive noumenal identity. This identity, Kant believes, sufficiently
grounds the belief that when we act morally, we act freely. This is
because moral action, ex hypothesi, eliminates all sensible impulses, and
therefore, what instigates our action is the rational, noumenally-free
aspect of us. So, when we act morally, we act under the 'idea' of free-
dom,14 adopting the noumenal standpoint, which suffices (Kant believes)
to make our actions free. Kant claims that we are entitled to assume that
underlying appearances there are things as they are in themselves. But, as
10 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), A534/B562.
11 Ibid.
12 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Gary Hatfield
(Cambridge: Cambridge University   Press, 2004), [4:363].
13 Ralph Walker, Kant: The Arguments of the Philosophers (London: Routledge,
1978), p. 148. 
14 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, [4:448].
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I see it, Kant is not entitled to any such assumption since he violates his
own epistemology. 
In essence, Kant is not permitted to make any positive or negative
property attributions to the noumenal self. As a thing-in-itself, outside of
time and space, noumenal realms and selves are not an accessible part of
our epistemology. This can only mean that the postulation of the noume-
nal realm is mere fideism and a gratuitous circumvention of determinism.
But this is the central tenet of his transcendental idealism. Kant might be
right, we might be free – but he can’t know it, he can’t say it, and he has
no reason to think it. If he’s right, it’s a blind guess. As Strawson notes,
this conclusion looks disastrous for Kant, since human freedom and
moral justice would be illusory if the natural world were all there was.15
Thankfully, however, Kant's moral theory can survive without what
Onora O’Neill dubbed his 'panicky metaphysics',16 and I will be arguing
for a conception of freedom that requires no such thing. 
It is worth noting, finally, that Kant's motivation for invoking tran-
scendental freedom at the end of Groundwork III is metaphysical and not
normative. That is, Kant does not invoke transcendental freedom to show
why the moral law should govern us as human beings, but simply that it
does, given that, Kant claims, the moral law just is the fundamental
grounding to us as transcendentally free agents.17 Since transcendental
freedom does no normative explanatory work in his moral theory, I
believe that Kant's transcendental view can be unproblematically
divorced from his practical philosophy without doing violence to his
normative moral theory.
By contrast, my account makes a normative call on us from the
start. Since, I shall argue, freedom can be cultivated through self-mastery,
our foremost priority as agents is to develop ourselves in such a way that
can ultimately set us free. Moreover, since freedom is the ultimate condi-
tion of possibility in Kant's moral philosophy, I shall argue that we have a
second-order moral duty to develop ourselves in this way. To this end my
thesis repackages moral normativity back into freedom, leading to an
15 Peter F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason (Methuen: Routledge, 1966), p. 241.
16 Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 210.
17 'The moral "ought" is then his own necessary "will" as a member of an intelligible
world.' Kant, Groundwork, [4:455].
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even fuller and richer deontological theory of freedom than that which we
find in Kant’s transcendental account. 
So what exactly does freedom as self-cultivation consist in? In
short, it amounts to becoming as psychologically attuned as possible to
the moral law—like tuning in to Categorical Imperative FM with as little
interference as possible from the background noise of inclination. So the
more successfully we can approximate ourselves with the moral law as
our guiding action principle, the weaker heteronomous calls to action will
be.18 As Kant remarks in The Doctrine of Virtue, it is only when duty
itself becomes 'irresistible'19 that we 'prove our freedom in the highest
degree.'20 
§2a. From Noumena to Naturalism about Freedom: The Progressive 
View
Kant's progressive view of freedom, as I shall call it, involves posi-
tive self-compulsion.21 In this vein, Kant remains close in spirit to
Rousseau who claims that to in order to escape the slavery of our
appetites we must impose a law onto ourselves.22 The notion of self-
compulsion, understood as the capacity to prevail over inclination, is
fundamental to the acquisition of freedom on the progressive view.
18 There has been substantial discussion as to whether Kant’s account of freedom as
virtue instead amounts to freedom as continence. I follow Stephen Engstrom
(2002) in regarding Kant’s naturalised account of freedom as suggesting that the
more we succeed in self-compulsion, the fewer countervailing incentives there will
be to action. That is, the more successfully we have self-cultivated, the further we
are from mere continence, and the closer we are towards bona fide virtue. It seems
that the process of self-cultivation will always begin with continence, since all
dually-constituted (rational and sensible) beings have naturally imperfect wills,
which become perfected (freed from the tugs of sensibility) through rational self-
cultivation. It could only be on account of your possession of a holy will that you
would not need to self-cultivate the inner conditions of freedom on the view I am
propounding. As Baxley (2010) comments, an infinite holy will 'is wholly immune
to the very possibility of temptation ' and a finite holy will 'is constitutionally
incapable of succumbing to temptation'. 
19 Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, [6:382n].
20 Ibid.
21 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath, ed. Peter Health and J.B.
Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), [27:269-270].
22 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Christopher Betts (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 59.
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Crucially, Kant remarks that, no man is above self-compulsion.23 If this is
true, if we really are all capable of this self-compulsion, we can retain the
possibility of moral accountability, since self-compulsion is consistent
with a compatibilist theory of freedom: it's up to us. Therefore, on the
progressive view, you are pro tanto morally accountable, that is, to the
extent that you have developed yourself through self-compulsion.
This thought is developed by Guyer, who argues that freedom as
self-compulsion is nothing more than moral discipline that can be culti-
vated by regulating our inclinations according to a rational principle.24
According to Guyer, if we are going to realise our freedom whilst reject-
ing the transcendental picture, we will need to achieve control over our
other feelings through our determination to act in accordance with the
moral law. For this, he claims, we require certain 'aesthetic preconditions
of the mind’s receptivity to concepts of duty',25 which turn out to be the
same conditions of possibility for freedom on the progressive view. 
§2b. Naturalistic Conditions of Possibility
In his discussion of the 'aesthetic of morals',26 Kant’s first stop is
moral feeling—the feeling of respect we have for the moral law. In culti-
vating moral feeling as a precondition of self-mastery, Kant says we must
learn to 'strengthen it through wonder at its inscrutable source',27 namely
the moral law itself. In strengthening our affective respect for the moral
law we increase our capacity for self-mastery over inclinations, whereby
the practical moral feeling, 'self-wrought by means of a rational
concept',28 defeats competing pathological hindrances to our ability to act
from duty. Furthermore, since this affect is rational, its cultivation can be
guarded against the charge of heteronomy.
A further precondition of successful self-mastery is to cultivate
conscience.29 Conscience for Kant consists in 'the voice of the inner
23 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, [27:270].
24 Paul Guyer, 'Progress Towards Autonomy,' in Kant on Moral Autonomy ed. Oliver
Sensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 76.
25 Ibid., p. 82. My emphasis.
26 Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, [6:406].
27 Ibid., [6:400]. 
28 Kant, Groundwork, [4:401n].
29 In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant invites us to think of human being as bearing a dual
personality [DV, 6:439n]. His motivation for this comes from his discussion of
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judge',30 to whom an agent can listen more successfully the better that
person gets to know himself. As Kant states in the Critique of Practical
Reason, the moral law itself has the power to '[humiliate] every human
being when he compares the sensible propensity of his nature with it.' 31
So when we develop our consciences, we succeed in holding our inclina-
tions up to rational scrutiny, whereby this scrutiny can serve to humiliate
and humble us when we notice how far our incentives deviate from the
standard demanded by the categorical imperative. Accordingly,
conscience requires that we learn to discriminate between autonomous
and heteronomous incentives.
But this does, admittedly, look like a dodgy move on Kant’s part.
Across his practical philosophy, Kant maintains that we cannot be sure
whether our incentives are moral or non-moral. His position in The
Doctrine of Virtue might, therefore, amount to no more than wishful
thinking. For while he grants that 'a human being cannot see into the
depth of his own heart so as to be quite certain of the purity of his moral
intention',32 Kant maintains that an agent must nevertheless 'strive with all
[his] might that the thought of duty for its own sake is the sufficient
incentive of every action conforming to duty.'33  
Thus far, then, the naturalistic picture of self-cultivation as a means
to acquiring freedom has shown how the achievement of self-mastery
necessary for freedom involves that we practice techniques that help
support the reign of the moral law, where the better we become at this, the
better able we are to judge countervailing inclinations as productive of
unfit, heteronomous maxims for action. When freedom is acquired
through this process of self-mastery, the cultivation of moral feeling and
conscience help us suppress competing inclinations. When we become
able to surmount inclinations we finally realise what Kant calls 'inner-
conscience—the concept of which he says would be 'contradictory' if we didn’t
conceive of man as bipartite. That is, the idea that we have an inner, authoritative
juror (in what Kant calls the 'inner court') is absurd if there is not also part of us
standing trial. It seems that Kant can maintain the fundamental idea of bipartition
without having to commit to any panicky metaphysics. The contemporary analogue
of the bipartite (moral) personality could be the picture of human agency found in
Frankfurt’s 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.' 
30 Ibid., [6:401].
31 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), [5:74].
32 Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, [6:392].
33 Ibid., [6:393].
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freedom', 34 which he also describes as the 'virtue of moral self-
constraint'.35 
It should be apparent therefore that, according to the view I am
propounding, freedom constitutes an achievement of the rational aspect of
the self. Pointedly, this is not a self who is free only in virtue of having
membership in the noumenal realm; instead, effortful self-development
entails a battle to become practically free. Kant remarks that our inclina-
tions are 'monsters [we have] to fight,'36 and only through the process of
rational self-development do we emerge victorious, earning ourselves a
place in a possible realm of ends. So as we progressively become better
autocrats, we earn and enhance our capacity for agency, and so for free-
dom. 
Added corroboration for these sympathies is found in Kant’s
Lectures on Anthropology. Here Kant speaks of the battle between sensi-
bility and the power of choice as a battle we have the power to win.37  It
seems that if Kant were wholeheartedly committed to the transcendental
picture of freedom, there would be no sense in discussing a power of
choice and our requirement to discipline sensibility through the under-
standing. This is brought out further in Kant’s claim that sensibility
deserves blame since 'it draws us against our power of choice in the direc-
tion where the understanding did not want to go'.38 
On this point, it bears recalling Sidgwick’s objection to Kant’s tran-
scendental theory of freedom.39 Sidgwick contends that the picture of
freedom and morality jointly issuing from the self qua noumenon renders
paradoxical the possibility we can do wrong willingly. In short Sidg-
wick’s objection is this: if we do wrong freely, we are, in fact, not acting
freely after all, since on Kant’s picture when we act freely we are ex
hypothesi acting morally. Sigwick’s objection can, however, be met if we
accept a naturalisation of Kant’s account of freedom. That Kant discusses
the possibility of censuring immoral conduct is an invitation to think
34 Denis, 'A Kantian Conception of Human Flourishing,' p. 182.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Anthropology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), [25:1231].
38 Ibid.
39 Henry Sidgwick, 'The Kantian Conception of Free Will', Mind, Vol. 13 (1888), p.
405.
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pragmatically about his theory of freedom. In this vein, naturalising
Kant’s account of freedom enables us to move away from the cramped
and unhappy disjunctions of 'free or un-free' and 'moral or immoral'
towards thinking about such normative concepts as operating in matters
o f degree. I imagine that Kant with his anthropological hat on would
welcome this interpretative move. At the very least, the texts to which I
have been referring give license to this reading. 
§3. The Duty to Self-Master
It should be apparent, then, that according to the progressive view
of freedom, we have a second-order duty to cultivate ourselves as auto-
crats. Accordingly, normativity is restored to Kant’s theory of freedom.
As I see it, the duty to self-master is a duty preceding all other duties. For
example, first-order duties would include particular moral acts them-
selves, namely those that conform to the categorical imperative. A
second-order duty, however, would involve cultivating the kind of char-
acter that is maximally susceptible to the normative force of the categori-
cal imperative. As Guyer sees it, and to use Kant’s deontic terminology,
this kind of self-cultivation constitutes an imperfect duty to oneself,
whereby we 'perfect [our] moral [personalities]'40 and 'make [ourselves]
more perfect than mere nature created [us]'.41 Recall, furthermore, that,
according to Kant, imperfect duties promote the very possibility of free
choice. Therefore, if free choice itself depends upon self-cultivating the
aforementioned aesthetic preconditions of the mind’s receptivity to duty,
then through self-cultivation we make possible our capacity for freedom
and morality—all the while without noumenal membership. As Kant
states in the Critique of Practical Reason, 'whatever diminishes the
hindrances to an activity is a furthering of this activity itself'.42 In cultivat-
ing the aforementioned aesthetic preconditions, we wrest power from
pathological inclination, which would otherwise thwart the practical effi-
cacy of the moral law. But whilst removing this merely negative condi-
tion—like freeing a prisoner from his shackles—we simultaneously
achieve something positive: the ability to act from the motive of duty
itself. We might otherwise call this an enhancement in our freedom.  
40 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p. 32.
41 Ibid.
42 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, [5:79]. Own emphasis.
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However, while Kant stipulates that the duty to self-cultivate is
imperfect, he also claims that it is a wide duty.43 It bears recalling that,
according to Kant, wide duties are those that are not absolute, that is, no
rational principle prescribes the degree to which we must engage in them.
However, given what’s at stake, I think Kant is wrong on this point—
surely the duty to self-cultivate should be made more stringent? For self-
cultivation is, on the view I have propounded, the very condition of possi-
bility for freedom itself—shouldn’t its cultivation therefore constitute a
narrow duty? After all, failure to self-cultivate entails our failure to fulfill
all further moral duties through aesthetic unresponsiveness to the dictates
of practical reason itself. I grant that Kant may be right insofar as reason
cannot dictate exactly how far we should self-cultivate: reason would, I
presume, suggest we self-cultivate as much as possible, allowing a degree
of latitude, or ‘space of permissions.’ Notwithstanding, in his discussion
of the duty to self-cultivate as contributing towards one’s moral perfec-
tion, Kant does himself recognise that this duty 'promotes [our] capacity
to realise all sorts of possible ends',44 thus rendering it, he says, a 'duty in
itself'.45 So perhaps the distinction between wide and narrow duties is
really a moot point: Kant does recognise the foremost importance of self-
cultivation, since our capacity to set moral ends tout court depends upon
it.
§4. Naturalising the Noumenal
Finally, I want to draw attention to the fact that the metaphysics of
transcendental freedom is incompatible with the mechanics of the
progressive view of freedom I have offered here.  At bottom, the tran-
scendental claim that the moral self is properly located in a non-
spatiotemporal realm cannot coexist with a naturalistic reading of Kant,
which, by contrast, describes the act of becoming free as a temporally-
extended process. That Kant did in fact accept such a view is intimated
throughout The Doctrine of Virtue by his very choice of language. For
example, Kant describes freedom from contra-moral inclinations46 in
43 Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, [6:392].
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. Kant’s choice of language here is quite revealing. If a ‘duty in itself’ is
intended in the same sense as ‘an end in itself’ (when Kant speaks of respect for
humanity in Groundwork II), is Kant not suggesting that the duty to self-cultivate
can and should be made universal law—of objectively, unconditional value? If so,
then the duty to self-cultivate looks not to be wide after all. 
46  Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, [6:477].
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temporally-extended terms, citing 'strength',47 'cultivation' and 'striving'48
as properties required on the part of the agent to make inner-freedom
possible. Furthermore, Kant claims that these character attributes arise
from 'deeds and not gifts'.49 It seems that if Kant repudiated the idea that
freedom could be gifted to us, the ‘freebie’ of noumenal membership is
something of an unwanted present. Freedom understood as a de facto
disposition is an unwelcome notion in The Doctrine of Virtue.50
Furthermore, on a more technically linguistic note, the very talk of
'becoming' is nonsensical when it comes to noumena. As Paul Guyer
notes, if we uphold the ontology of transcendental selfhood, the act of
moral choice amounts to nothing more sophisticated than merely 'throw-
ing an on–off switch in the noumenal world'51 and thus not describable in
progressive terms at all. Accordingly, the intelligibility of terms such as
'strength', 'striving' and 'success' (and even virtue itself) is annulled if
transcendental selfhood is upheld. By contrast, these terms cohere
unproblematically with Kant’s naturalised stance in The Doctrine of
Virtue, whereby the degree to which we succeed in matters of freedom
and morality is necessarily correlated with our success in the foremost
task of self-cultivation. 
Conclusion
Thus, to reiterate a claim I made in the introduction to this paper,
my task here was to make a case regarding the role of self-cultivation as a
precondition of our responsiveness to the concept of duty. It was not my
intention to proffer a naturalistic account of freedom concerning the
moment at which actions are taken. Rather my interest was to expose and
evaluate Kant’s claim that without cultivating a primitive susceptibility to
concept of duty, the moral law could not affect us. I have developed this
claim into a theory of freedom whose scope is necessarily limited.
According to my account, in growing susceptible to the concept of duty
we do not guarantee that we become the law’s unerring executors. Rather,
we merely become responsive to its dictates, and only subsequently
47  Ibid., [6:405].
48  Ibid., [6:446].
49  Ibid., [6:386]. My emphases.
50  Owing to this, Kant’s dogmatic assertion in the second Critique that the ‘fact of
reason’ is the grounding of the freedom of the will is as unpalatable a claim as the
ontological dogmatism of noumenal membership we find in Groundwork III.
51  Guyer, Progress Towards Autonomy, p. 78.
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responsible for its execution, according to a principle that stipulates
ought implies can. 
Thus, given that my focus here was on our susceptibility to the
moral law, transcendental freedom might appear to be a false opponent, in
tension only prima facie with my thesis. After all, these theories might
not be in competition, rather, they might be concerned with different and
non-overlapping aspects of agency: self-cultivation as an aesthetic
precondition of Kantian agency, and transcendental freedom as a guaran-
tee that moral action can, after all, be causally adduced to pure practical
reason. However, transcendental freedom according to Kant, at least at
the end of the Groundwork, is invoked as the whole story about agency:
everything from susceptibility to efficacy is, Kant holds, accounted for by
the theory. But according to the evidence of The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant
explicitly naturalises the part of the story concerned with susceptibility,
and new terminology (in particular Willkür, which is notably absent in the
Groundwork) is brought in to help explain our capacity to develop, for
example, susceptibility to the concept of duty in the first place. Freedom
as self-cultivation should therefore be understood quite apart from Kant’s
theoretical commitments, instead as part of moral anthropology, for
which we need do no heavy metaphysics. 
